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Abstract
In absence of bank risk-taking behavior, opacity is dened as the inability of depos-
itors, speculators and central banker to disentangle default risk and assets return
from the assets value. We show the conditions under which opacity leads to runs
on a solvent bank in equilibrium and uncertainty on fundamental values of the as-
set. The main repercussion of the opacity is, however, on the central banks policy
response which is ine¢ cient during a banking crisis.
Key words: Opacity, Bank Runs, Central Bank Intervention, Cash-in-Market
Pricing.
JEL Classication: E5, E61, G01, G1, G21.
1 Introduction
The opacity of banks is conventionally perceived as the investors and any
other interested agent inability to assess the e¤ective riskiness embodied in
the banksassets portfolio. The di¢ culty in quantifying risk arises from ei-
ther the banks engagement in less-transparent and non-traditional activities
-Myers and Rajan (1995), Morgan (2002), Wagner (2007)- or from limited
accounting disclosures -Cordella and Yeyati (1998), Estrella (2004)-. Asym-
metric information and/or moral hazard are, thus, the prerequisites to the
opacity existence.
To many observers, opacity has had a key role during the recent banking
crisis. The uncertainty regarding the actual solvency status of banks at the
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crisisoutburst was essentially due to the discretionary accounting standards
used by banks in their assetsvaluation. Specically, fair value standards 1
were only applied to trading books of banks and to brokerage rmsholdings
valuation. Illiquid assets were, instead, valued at each banks discretion us-
ing internal models. Such internal models make hardly valuable, eventually
from outsiders of the bank, the real level of assets risk. Moreover, missing
markets and uncertainty on fundamental values for the toxicproducts have
considerably intensied the concerns on the actual solvency of many banks.
The response of the US authorities to this concern has been somehow contro-
versial. The Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) on April the 2nd
2009 decided to relax mark-to-market valuation rules, giving, thus, more dis-
cretion to banks when evaluating whether a permanent loss has occurred and
how to measure it. Moreover, the announcement of the details of the results
of the stress test carried out on the top 19 US banks has occurred after a long
debate on whether the public disclosure was appropriate. In reply, notwith-
standing investors were soliciting for more transparency in order to restore
market condence.
Probably, this policy support to "opacity", through relaxed valuation rules,
nds its support also in the existing theoretical models. Cordella and Yeyati
(1998), for instance, argue that portfolio risk disclosure increases the proba-
bility of bank failure when the bank manager does not have control over the
volatility of the assetsreturn. In Myers and Rajan (1995) opacity 2 is desir-
able for the investors as it leaves limited scope for trading assets and asset
substitution undertaken by managers. Wagner (2007) shows that it is opti-
mal for banking managers to be less-transparent, especially during periods of
1 In order to assess their fairsolvency status, banks should have recognized their
marked-to-market losses which imply the unveiling of their opaque balance sheet.
2 Opacity in this paper implies less liquid assets.
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increased nancial development.
These existing models, thus, by focusing on the conditions under which opac-
ity is optimal by the bank manager, leave unexplored the e¤ects on opacity
on several interesting issues such as the run/no-run decision of depositors,
asset market pricing and central bankers intervention. Understanding the ex-
istence of opacity a¤ects other agents, other than the banks prot-maximizers
managers, is obviously relevant for policy-makers.
The aim of this work is to account for all these issues in a simple theoreti-
cal model in which opacity has an enhanced role. In particular, we consider
opacity as a per-se phenomenon which is not implied by moral hazard behav-
iors or asymmetric information, as found in the existing theoretical models.
In this regard we re-dene opacity as the inability of depositors, speculators
and central banker to disentangle default risk and assets return from the as-
sets expected return. We abstract from asymmetric information since the bank
faces the same uncertainty when proposing to depositors a standard deposit
contract. The signal on the assets expected return, which is true and accurate,
is determined by the nature and announced by the bank in an intermediate
period, when all the agents have the same information set. Moreover, we as-
sume that the contract o¤ered to depositors solves the optimal risk-sharing
problem (Allen and Gale (1998)) in which the riskiness of the illiquid asset is
irrelevant for the optimal portfolio allocation chosen by the bank. In this way,
we are able to abstract from a situation in which the bank has incentives to
undertake a moral hazard-type of behavior.
Our modied version of the benchmark model of Allen and Gale (1998) implies
the inclusion of default risk of the risky asset; this added feature allows us to
draw interesting implications of opacity for bank-runs and re-sale pricing
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when speculators are either risk-neutral or risk-averse. We show that with
opacity a bank run may occur with positive probability in equilibrium even
if the bank turns out to be solvent when uncertainty unveils. Moreover, we
argue that opacity leads to uncertainty on the fundamental value of the risky
asset when speculators in the asset market are risk-averse. Intervention by a
central banker has many interesting features when opacity occurs. Intervention
is desirable since the central banker bears the eventual losses from the risky
asset, ensuring a xed level of consumption to depositors. However, the central
bank lends either more or less than the bank should be entitled to, given the
quality of its assets.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we propose the theoretical
framework of the paper in which we dene the standard deposit contract of-
fered by the bank to consumers and the asset market in which the risky asset
might be traded. Moreover, we specify the information set of the bank, con-
sumers and speculators. Section 3 looks at the risky asset market pricing given
the opaque signal sent by the nature in the interim period. We distinguish be-
tween two cases: one in which speculators are risk-neutral and another in
which they are risk-averse. In section 4 we introduce the central banker and
we analyze the welfare e¤ects for the consumers following an intervention. We
draw di¤erent welfare implication depending on whether the speculators are
risk-neutral or risk-averse. Section 6 concludes.
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2 The Model
2.1 Framework
The model comprises a four-periods economy, t = 0; 1; 3
2
; 2, with one consump-
tion good (withdrawals). The agents in this framework are: one representative
risk-neutral bank, a continuum of rational depositors/consumers and specula-
tors. In section 4 we will introduce the central banker.
2.1.1 Depositors
Depositors are uninsured with initial endowment E normalized to 1, i.e. E = 1.
They will deposit all their endowment in t = 0 at the bank, which o¤ers
them insurance against idiosyncratic liquidity shock 3 . Indeed, at period 0,
depositors do not know when they will be hit by an idiosyncratic liquidity
shock: with probability  a given consumer will be withdrawing C1 at t = 1,
thus, being early consumer, and with probability 1    he will withdraw C2
in t = 2 being a late consumer. Ex-ante, the size of  is known, however,
each consumer does not know which type (early/late) he will be at t = 1. The
continuum of depositors is normalized to one such that  is the proportion of
early consumers. The utility arising from the consumption of each type in each
period is described by a concave and continuous consumersutility function
u(Ct):
3 The bank invests on behalf of consumers given its expertise in recognizing valuable
risky assets. Deposits allow consumers that are hit in the last date by a liquidity
shock to enjoy the return of the investment made by the bank. Depositors that
are hit by the liquidity shock in the earlier period are assured a given level of
consumption.
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2.1.2 The Bank
At t = 0 the risk-neutral bank issues demand deposit liabilities equal to one
unit of consumption, collecting the whole consumersendowment. The bank
operates in a competitive market, maximizing the expected utility of con-
sumers; moreover, the bank knows the size of .
At date 0 the bank can invest the deposits in a safe and in a risky asset.
The safe asset, y, is in variable supply and can be considered as a storage
technology whose price at t = 0 is normalized to one and can be liquidated
at no cost both at t = 1 and at t = 2; it has a risk-free gross return equal
to 1. The amount of investment in risky asset is denoted x and is such that
x+ y = 1. x is in xed supply and yields a random return R only in t = 2. In
t = 2 R yields Rh with probability p or zero with probability 1  p.
2.1.2.1 Information set of the Bank and Consumers At t = 0 and
t = 1 both the bank and the consumers face the same uncertainty regarding the
random variable R. More specically, they do not know both the probability
density function of R and the exact value that R might take in the good state,
that is Rh.
Therefore, these agents in t = 0 and t = 1 know that in t = 2 R yields ~Rh
with probability pi or zero with probability 1   pi where i = l; h If p = pl
then, the asset carries an high default risk; if p = ph then, the default risk is
low. The probability p allows us to model the default risk of the risky asset,
which is, in any case equal to 1  pi. With probability  p = ph while p = pl
occurs with probability 1  : In other words, the agents could be facing one
of the two cases:
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Case 1 Low default risk. With probability :
Rph = h
~Rh
0
with prob. ph
with prob. 1  ph
with E[Rph ] = ph ~Rh:
Case 2 High default risk. With probability 1  :
Rpl = h
~Rh
0
with prob. pl
with prob. 1  pl
with E[Rpl ] = pl ~Rh:
~Rh is also a random variable which is assumed to be distributed according to
a normal distribution with mean Rh and nite variance Rh. The distribution
of Rh is ex-ante common knowledge.
We further assume that E[Rpi ] > 1 this implies that investment in risky asset
dominates in terms of expected value the investment in storage technology.
2.1.2.2 The Deposit Contract The bank o¤ers non-state contingent
contracts that allow depositors to withdraw their funds on demand in either
t = 1 or t = 2 in the fashion of Allen and Gale (1998).
The bank promises a xed level of consumptions C1 = c to early consumers
and C2 > c to late consumers. If it is unfeasible to give c to all consumers then
there is risky asset liquidation and pro-rata distribution among all depositors.
The size of c is computed from a state-contingent optimal risk-sharing problem
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where no asset liquidation takes place of the type. Since there is aggregate
uncertainty in both the return and of its probability density function of the
risky asset, the optimal risk sharing problem will yield an optimal portfolio
choice (y; x) which is independent of R; Rh and of the probabilities attached
to it:
The problem can be formalized as follows (see Allen and Gale (1998) for
details):
MaxE[
x;y
U(C1) + (1  )U(C2)] (ORS)
subject to:
y + x  1 (i)
C1(R)  y (ii)
C1(R) + (1  )C2(R)  y +Rx (iii)
The solution to the above problem (y; x) will determine the consumption
levels of early and late consumers. In particular, the bank will promise c to
early consumers such that:
C1 = c =
y

(1)
Late consumers will receive:
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C2 =
Rx
1   (2)
In the benchmark model aggregate uncertainty only concerns the return on
the risky asset and is accurately revealed at t = 1; there, runs only happen
on a truly insolvent banks 4 (i. e. when R is low enough so that C2 < c).
However, as we will show in the section 4, our stochastic structure of p and Rh
yields to di¤erent implications for the run decisions of consumers, as it causes
uncertainty on the size of C2 (i. e. (2) is not accurately observed).
2.1.3 Speculators and Asset Market
There exists an asset market in which the bank can liquidate the risky asset
in the intermediate period t = 1 whenever the withdraw of early consumers
exceeds y: In this market there are some identical speculators that will want
to purchase the risky asset whenever speculative prots can be made, i.e.
when its price falls below its fundamental value. Speculators hold some of the
y asset, ys, which will be exchanged for the risky asset at a re-sale price.
This price will be determined by the size of ys: indeed, speculators will nd it
protable to exchange all their storage technology for the risky asset. Thus,
the market price (cash-in-market pricing) will be:
Px =
ys
x
(3)
Throughout the paper we will only consider the case in which ys < y; this
assumption allows us to rule out many cases that are not of interest given the
aim of our paper. It is, however, reasonable to think that the portfolio of the
4 Throughout the paper, we refer to insolvent bank as a bank which is not able to
guarantee at least c to all consumers.
9
bank is by far larger than that of speculators, so that can invest in a larger
portion of the safe asset.
2.1.3.1 Information set of Speculators. We assume that speculators
have the same information set of banks and consumers. However, the size of
ys is speculators private information in t = 1: it is revealed only if cash in
market pricing takes place after than a run has occurred.
2.2 Timing, Signal and Runs on a Solvent Bank
2.2.1 Timing and Signal
In the previous section we have outlined the uncertainty regarding pi and Rh
faced by all agents in the model in both t = 0 and t = 1: The main implication
of the above framework is that late consumers can only observe the expected
value of their level of consumption in the nal period, i.e. C2: That is:
E[C2] =
E[R]x
1   =
Rhx
1  (p
h + (1  )pl) (4)
However, we assume that in t = 1 the nature reveals a true and accurate signal
on the expected value of the risky asset. That is,
 = E[R] = pRh (5)
Denition An accurate signal on the assets expected return is opaque
because it does not enable agents to disentangle default risk and assets return.
The main implication of the above opaque signal is that depositors cannot
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assess with certainty how much of the observed  is due to default risk and
asset return.
The uncertainty regarding pi and Rh is solved in t = 3
2
while the uncertainty
regarding whether R is Rh or zero is solved in the last period, t = 2. Therefore,
the expected consumption of late consumers becomes:
E[C2] =
x
1   (6)
Late consumers, given  = 1 , will run only if the following condition holds:
E[C2] < c (7)
that is, if:
 <
y
x
(8)
Since  > 1 then it must also be that a run can only occur when y > x:
Clearly, values of  su¢ ciently low can imply very opposite outcomes: very
high returns associated with very high default risk or very low returns and
low default risk.
If the above condition holds, then, the run will cause costly liquidation on the
asset market. As stated in the previous section, when consumers decide to run
they do not know the exact size of ys and so what the market price will be
in case of liquidation. While formal asset pricing is derived in the following
section, we now summarize the timing of the framework in gure 1.
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Figure 1: Timing of the model
2.2.2 Runs on a Solvent Bank
The problem of runs dictated by the expected values of future consumptions
is mainly that there can be equilibriums in which a run has occurred on what
turns out to be a solvent bank. In particular, for a given portfolio choice of
the bank, (y; x), ine¢ cient runs in these terms will depend on the sizes of
Rhi:
Lets assume that  < y

x so that a run occurs. The bank recur to the asset
market for costly liquidation, as we will model in detail in section 3. When
default risk is low ( = 1) 5 and the good state of the world unveils in t = 2
(pi = ph = 1) the bank is solvent if:
Rhl >
y
x
(9)
Or, if:
 <
y
x
< Rhl (10)
Proposition 1 In the presence of an opaque signal such that   ! 1 and
 < y

x , there might be in equilibrium a run on a potentially solvent bank if
5 We are implicitly assuming that Rhhx > y:
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the good state of the world materializes with low default risk. This will occur
whenever Rhl > y

x :
However, the opposite does not hold true: if a bank is insolvent, a run will
never occur with an opaque signal. This is because  > y

x and R
hl < y

x (such
that Rhl < y

x < ) can never occur jointly given that  < R
hl.
3 Risky Asset Market Pricing
3.1 Risk-Neutral Speculators
In this section we consider the pricing of the risky asset in the market when
identical speculators are risk-neutral. If at date 1 the bank receives an higher
level of withdraws than its available liquidty promised to early consumers,
then it is obliged by its contract terms to liquidate all its risky asset and
distribute the revenues on a pro-rate basis to all consumers..
The speculators in this market will observe the signal  before carrying out any
purchase of the risky asset. In particular, the signal  = E[R] will perfectly
reect the fundamental value of the asset, given the risk neutrality of specu-
lators. Indeed, the risk-neutrality of these agents implies that their spending
decisions are not a¤ected by the default risk or the relative return implied in
the signal. Speculators, then, once observed  will purchase the risky asset if
its market price, Px, is below its fundamental value, i.e.  6 .
The pricing in the market happens through a cash-in-market mechanism
(Allen and Gale 1998).That is, since speculators will want to exchange all
6 The safe asset is held by speculators in order to exchange it with protable pur-
chases of the risky asset.
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their safe asset for the risky, given  > 1, then the price of the risky asset
will simply be the ratio of the safe asset of the speculators, ys, to the risky
asset of the bank, x. In other words, it is the amount of safe asset, readily
exchangeable to cash, to determine the market price of the risky asset. How-
ever, speculators will only buy if speculative prots can be made, that is, if
the liquidity in their hands is such that prices are below fundamentals, that
is:
Px =
ys
x
 E(R) =  (11)
Given that (8) must hold, in order to a run to ever occur, then it must be that
speculators will purchase the risky asset whenever the observed signal satises
the following condition:
ys
x
   y

x
(12)
The associated consumption levels will be:
C1 = C2 =
y + ys
2
(13)
Figures A1 and A2 depict the asset market pricing of the risky asset and
the (expected and actual) late consumption levels for all signal levels signal
respectively. In gure 1A it can be seen that for  < ys
x there does not exist
a market for the risky asset, thus, its market price is zero as speculators are
not willing to buy the risky asset. In this case, as shown in 2A, early and late
consumers share equally the available safe asset in the banks portfolio, i.e. y.
It is clearly seen from the pictures that when (12) is satised, then the late
(realized) consumption level is as specied in (13). For high enough signals,
i.e.  > y

x , then no run occurs and expected late consumption, as perceived
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in t=1, is equal to E[C2] = x.
3.2 Risk-Averse Speculators
In this section we relax the assumption of risk-neutrality of speculators, by
assuming that they are risk-averse. The main implication of this modied
setting is that the observed signal  does not reveal anymore the fundamental
value of the risky asset. Therefore, speculators now face uncertainty regarding
the intrinsic value of the asset. Indeed, now the fundamental value has to reect
the default premia that speculators require to take on more risk. At date 1,
if the risky asset has a higher default risk, i.e. pi = pl; then its fundamental
value will be lower than the fundamental value of the asset with the lower
default risk, i.e. pi = pl. The fundamental values of the asset in each state of
the world can be written as:
F hv =
E(R)
1 + l
(14)
F lv =
E(R)
1 + h
(15)
where l and h are the discounts which reect the default premia of the asset
in each state with h > l: Given F hv > F
l
v, F
h
v is the fundamental value of
the asset for which  = phRhl is true; while F lv is the fundamental value of the
asset for which  = plRhh is true.
Speculators, will buy the risky asset only if (8) occurs and if the two conditions
below are satised:
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E(Fv) = F
h
v + (1  )F lv > 1 (16)
Px =
ys
x
< E(Fv) (17)
Condition (16) implies that the expected fundamental value corresponding to
the observed  has a gross return higher than that of the safe asset. (17),
instead, states that the liquidity (safe asset, ys) in the hands of speculators
has to be such that the market price of the risky asset is less than the expected
fundamental value. Indeed, buying only if ys
x
< F lv, would prevent speculators
to make potential speculative prots if F lv <
ys
x
< E(Fv). Solving (17) with
respect to , we nd that:

ys
x
<  (18)
Where:
 =
1
 
=
1

1+l
+ (1 )
1+h
> 1 (19)
Combining (8) with (18), we nd that the buy-condition for risk-averse spec-
ulators is:

ys
x
<   y

x
(20)
Or:
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y0s
x
<   y

x
(21)
with ys = y0s.
The market price of the risky asset, if speculators buy is always ys
x
:However,
now, contrarily to what seen in the previous section, there is the chance that
speculators might not make speculative prots. Figures 3A and 4A in the
appendix show how this might occur. Lets consider the case in which specu-
lators purchase the risky asset as condition (21) holds for an observed . In 3A
speculators hold a larger amount of ys; at a market price Px =
ys
x
speculative
prots will be made only if uncertainty unveils in t = 3
2
that  = phRhl so
that Fv = F hv . If in t =
3
2
, indeed, turns out that  = plRhh, then the asset
has been overpriced by the cash-in-market mechanism, i.e. speculators have
paid too much for the risky asset. If, instead, ys is lower, as depicted in 4A;
then speculative prots can be made even if uncertainty unveils in t = 3
2
that
 = plRhh (i.e. Fv = F lv) given that the signal is at least s. If, instead, the
signal is such that y
0
s
x <   s then again speculators have paid too much
for the risky asset. It is worth noting that a buying strategy for speculators
which implies buying if s <   y
x is not desirable since it would preclude
speculators to make considerable prots if Fv = F hv .
A last case should also be considered here; that is, the possibility that the
safe asset in the hands of speculators could be so low that they would make
speculative prots whatever the signal. In this case the market prices would
much smaller than the so-far considered cases and speculators will price the
risky asset at a price lower than F lv for all signal included in
y0s
x <   y

x :
If there is no central bankers intervention, late consumers will be better o¤the
higher ys in the speculatorsportfolio, given that it is proportional to market
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price paid for the asset.
We can formalize these results as follows:
Proposition 2 With risk-averse speculators an opaque signal causes uncer-
tainty on the fundamental value of the risky asset. When speculators hold
enough safe asset they may overprice the risky asset if the nature unveils a
state of the world with high default risk. In this instance, late consumers are
better o¤ than if the safe asset in the hands of speculators was lower. There-
fore, consumers benet at the speculators expenses from speculators higher
amounts of safe asset holdings with higher default risk.
4 Central Bankers Intervention
In this section we consider the welfare e¤ects of an intervention by the central
banker. The central bank cannot restore consumption levels of a no-run equi-
librium but can guarantee higher levels of late and early consumption than if
cash-in-market pricing had taken place.
The central banker in this model has the same information set of consumers.
That is, he observes the signal  at t = 1. Depending on the market price of the
risky asset, whenever, a bank run occurs, the central banker might decide to
intervene in order to sustain asset prices. If intervenes, he enters a repurchase
agreement with the bank in which he purchase the risky asset. The price
paid for the risky asset in the repo agreement is equal to its fundamental if
investors are risk-neutral. If, instead, investors are risk-averse then the central
bank faces uncertainty on the fundamental value of the risky asset and might
over/under price the asset. The terms of the repurchase agreement oblige the
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bank to re-pay the central banker in t = 2 whatever it gets from the risky
asset. The central banker will enter the repo agreement only if its expected
net gain is greater than zero:
E[NGcb] = x  M [(1  ph) + (1  )(1  pl)] > 0 (22)
Where M = P sx is the price paid by the central banker to the bank for the
purchase of the risky asset at the support price P s.
4.1 Risk-Neutral Speculators
If the asset market is populated by risk-neutral investors, then the fundamen-
tal price of the asset is equal to the observed signal : The central banker
might decide to enter the repo agreement when the liquidity (safe asset) in
the hands of speculators is low enough to drive market prices below fundamen-
tals and when there is no market for the risky asset. Therefore, he will lend
M = x to the bank with P s = , i.e. he will sustain prices to fundamentals.
It can be easily noticed that in this setting the central bank will enter the
repo agreement at every level of . Indeed, (22) becomes:
E[NGcb] = xf1  [(1  ph) + (1  )(1  pl)]g > 0 8 (23)
The resulting consumption levels for early and late consumers will therefore,
be:
C1 = C2 =
y + x
2
(24)
19
This is greater that what consumers would have received if re-sale had oc-
curred:
y + x
2
>
y + Pxx
2
(25)
The main implication of the above intervention is that the central banker that
engages in the rescue intervention is not certain about the solvency of the
bank. Insolvency can be due to either the occurrence of the bad state of the
world, i.e. Rl = 0, or to the fact that in the good state of the world late
consumers get less than early consumers (this will depend on the size of Rhl).
The inability to distinguish a solvent from an insolvent bank renders the inter-
vention by the central bank risky, in the sense that the central bank could bear
the loss if either the bad state of the world materializes or Rhl is low enough
so that the realized (i.e. in t = 2) NGcb is less than zero. In the former case,
then the bank in t = 2 will be unable to pay anything to the central banker,
which will bear a loss equal to, the whole M . If instead, the good state of the
world materializes and Rhl < y

x , then the loss faced by the central banker will
be:
NGcb = (Rhlx) M < 0 (26)
The intervention by the central banker, moreover, avoids late consumers to
bear the losses incurred in the bad state of the world with Rl = 0: In fact, it
guarantees a xed level of consumption for late/early consumer equal to y
+x
2
which is in any case higher than what they would have received if the bank
had gone to the asset market. This is shown in gure 6A in which is depicted
the consumption levels (actual and expected) by late consumers following the
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central bankers intervention when  < y

x (blue line). Figure 6A, instead,
shows the e¤ect on the pricing of the risky asset of an intervention of this kind
(blue line): the price is equal to its fundamental for every level of the signal.
Proposition 3 With risk-neutral speculators the central bank will intervene
to support prices to fundamentals at every  < y

x . The central bank will carry
both the default risk and the risk that the bad state of the world materializes.
Consumers are guaranteed a sure and xed consumption level equal to y
+x
2
.
4.2 Risk-Averse Speculators
If the fundamental value of the risky asset is uncertain, then, it becomes more
problematic for the central bank to pursue an intervention aimed to support
fundamental prices. Reasonably, the central bankers intervention when there
is opacity in fundamental values will be such that (1) consumers get more than
they would do from the cash-in-market pricing and (2) the expected net gain
of the central banker are maximized. The risky asset price that the central
bank will support is, thus, dependent on these two conditions. However, it
will on a rst place depend on the cash-in-market price in the assets market
which is determined by ys. Indeed, a ts-for-all policy that sustain prices at
the expected fundamental level (i.e. P s = E(Fv) for 8  < yx ) could decrease
the expected net gains of the central bank. Lets see this in more details.
Lets assume, for simplicity, that the central bank has three possible interven-
tion strategies. That is, it can lend to the bank:
M1 = E(Fv)x
 (27)
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M2 = F
h
v x
 (28)
M3 = F
l
vx
 (29)
The corresponding expected net gains are:
E[NGcb1 ] = x
(  E(Fv))[(1  ph) + (1  )(1  pl)]g (30)
E[NGcb2 ] = x
(  F hv )[(1  ph) + (1  )(1  pl)]g (31)
E[NGcb3 ] = x
(  F lv)[(1  ph) + (1  )(1  pl)]g (32)
Given that  > E(Fv),  > F iv and that 0  (1   ph) + (1   )(1  pl)  1
then it must be that:
E[NGcb3 ] < E[NG
cb
1 ] < E[NG
cb
2 ] (33)
Also note that (30), (31) and (32) are all greater than zero 8, therefore the
central banker always wishes to intervene and lend to the bank.
4.2.1 Intervention with high levels of ys
If speculators hold abundant levels of ys in their portfolio, as described in
gure 3A, as we have already seen, they will make speculative prots only if
he fundamental value turns out to be high (low default risk) when y
0
s
x <   y

x .
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Sustaining asset price to low fundamental values, i.e. P s = F lv andM3 = F
l
vx
,
although maximizes the expected net gain of the central banker, would not
be a sustainable intervention. This is because early and late consumers would
get less than if speculators were purchasing the asset, that is:
y + ys
2
>
y + F lvx

2
(34)
Therefore, when y
0
s
x <   y

x the central bank will support prices to its ex-
pected fundamental values since E[NGcb3 ] < E[NG
cb
1 ]. The actual consumption
level are, thus:
C1 = C2 =
y + E[Fv]x
2
(35)
However, when the signal is low enough so that no market for the risky asset
exists, that is when  < y
0
s
x , then the central banker can support prices to low
fundamental values, that is P s = F lv. In this case, early and late consumers
will get more than if they were sharing equally the available y:
C1 = C2 =
y + F lvx

2
>
y
2
(36)
The pricing of the risky asset with central banks intervention and high levels
of ys is depicted in gure 7A in the appendix.
Proposition 4 With risk-averse speculators and high enough market prices
(and ys) the central bank intervenes to support prices at every  <
y
x . The
central bank will carry both the default risk and the risk that the bad state of
the world materializes. Consumers are guaranteed a xed consumption level
equal to y
+Psx
2
.
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A central bankers intervention of this kind (i;e. with opacity) can cause ine¢ -
cient asset pricing, that is, asset pricing di¤erent from fundamentals. Indeed,
when the signal is very low such as  < y
0
s
x the central bank might under-price
the asset, lending to the bank less than it should have received if in t = 3
2
it
occurs that  = phRhl (so that Fv = F hv ). For higher levels of the signals such
that y
0
s
x <   y

x the central bank is surely either over-pricing or under-pricing
the asset. In other words, the central bank is lending either more or less than
the bank should be entitled to, given the quality of its assets.
Proposition 5 Opacity leads to ine¢ cient policy responses. The central bank
can lend either more or less than the bank should be entitled to, given the
quality of its assets.
Proposition 6 Given high values of the signal (but always less than y

x ), risk-
averse speculators and high enough market prices (i.e. high ys), the policy
response is surely ine¢ cient.
4.2.2 Intervention with low levels of ys
If speculators hold relatively low levels of safe asset as in gure 4A, we have
already shown that there exist a boundary signal s which determines two
di¤erent outcomes for speculators. If the signal is such that s <   y
x ,
then, speculative prots can be made whatever the fundamental value unveils
(although clearly F hv is associated with higher prots). If, instead, the signal
is such that y
0
s
x <   s then again speculators make prots only if the default
risk attached to the asset is low, that is, if Fv = F hv .
The central banker, thus, will adopt three di¤erent intervention strategies,
depending on the observed signal. If there is no market for the risky asset as
 < y
0
s
x , as before, the central banker will support prices to F
l
v, lending to the
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bank M3 and achieving the consumption levels as in (37). If the signal is such
that y
0
s
x <   s then for the same reasoning as in the previous section, the
central banker lends M1 to the bank. If, instead, s <   yx then the central
bank will maximize its expected net gain by lending M3 to the bank, which
implies P s = F lv with the following consumption levels:
C1 = C2 =
y + F lvx

2
>
y + ys
2
(37)
The pricing of the risky asset with central banks intervention and low levels
of ys is depicted in gure 8A in the appendix.
The safe asset in the hands of speculators, however, could be so low that they
would make speculative prots whatever the signal (in this case the signal
s would not exist). In this case, clearly the central bank would support the
prices of the asset at its low fundamental value.
From these results we can formalize the following proposition:
Proposition 7 When speculators hold low levels of safe asset, so that market
prices are relatively lower, the central bank tends to support asset prices as
if they carried a high default risk. For a small interval of signals, however,
the central bank might over-price/under-price the asset.if the cash-in-market
mechanism yields a higher pricing than F lv.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have included opacity in a simple model in which a represen-
tative bank, solving an optimal risk-sharing problem when o¤ering a standard
deposit contract, is subject to runs by depositors. Opacity is modeled through
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the inclusion of unobservable default risk on the banks portfolio, as well as
unobservable return on the risky asset. The unability of the agents to distin-
guish between the two given a signal sent by the nature on their product has
many interesting implications. Firstly, we show that run decisions based on
expected consumption levels can cause a run on a solvent bank. Secondly, we
model the asset market pricing that occurs through a cash-in-market mecha-
nism. In this regard, we stress that if that opacity leads to uncertainty on the
fundamental value of the risky asset when speculators in the asset market are
risk-averse. Lastly, we analyze the welfare implications of a central bankers
intervention which is unable to prevent the run but ensures a xed level of
consumption higher than if speculators were purchasing the asset during a
run. The central banker, with the aim to minimize its loss function, supports
prices to the low fundamental values. In general, the lower the market prices,
the more likely the central banker will enter a repo agreement with the bank
by o¤ering a price for the risky asset equal to the lowest fundamental level
that it can take. Therefore, opacity can cause ine¢ cient policy responses. This
is because the central bank lends either more or less than the bank should be
entitled to, given the quality of its assets.
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Figures
Figure 1A: Risky asset pricing and observed signal with risk-neutral
speculators (without central bankers intervention)
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Figure 2A: Expected late consumption and observed signal with
risk-neutral speculators (without central bankers intervention)
A bank run associated with speculators purchase of the risky asset occurs
if the observed signal at date 1 is such that ys
x    y

x . Realized late
consumption in this case is equal to C2 =
y+ys
2
. It is easily seen that at this
consumption level, late consumers receive more than they would have got if
they did not run if ys
x    s = y
+ys
2x . Otherwise (i.e. if s    y

x ) late
consumers would have received more if they did not run and cash-in-market
pricing did not take place, even if E[C2] < y. Indeed, recall that when a run
takes place, consumers are unaware of the size of ys. When the signal is so
low that speculators are not willing to buy, i.e.   ys
x , the bank will share
equally among early and late consumers the available y. Also in this case,
late consumers might have received more if they did not run, in particular as
! ys
x .
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Figure 3A: Buying decision and observed signal with risk-averse
speculators- high levels of ys
Note that y0s
x = 
ys
x :
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Figure 4A: Buying decision and observed signal with risk-averse
speculators- low levels of ys
Note that y0s
x = 
ys
x :
Figure 5A: Risky asset pricing and observed signal with risk-neutral
speculators (with central bankers intervention)
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Figure 6A: Expected late consumption and observed signal with
risk-neutral speculators (with central bankers intervention)
Figure 7A: Risky asset pricing and observed signal with risk-averse
speculators (with central bankers intervention)- high levels of ys
The red lines refer to asset market pricing without intervention. That is, when
 < y
0
s
x there is no market for the risky asset; when
y0s
x <   y

x there is cash-
32
in-market asset pricing. In the former case, the central bank will support prices
to low fundamentals (blue line). In the latter case, it will support prices to
expected fundamental values (blue line).
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Figure 8A: Risky asset pricing and observed signal with risk-averse
speculators (with central bankers intervention)- low levels of ys
The red lines refer to asset market pricing without intervention. That is, when
 < y
0
s
x there is no market for the risky asset; when
y0s
x <   y

x there is cash-
in-market asset pricing. In the former case, the central bank will support prices
to low fundamentals (blue line). When y
0
s
x <   s the central banker support
prices at expected fundamental values (blue line). When s <   y
x the
central bank will support prices to low fundamentals (blue line).
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